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LITIGATING AGAINST
DISTANT INSURANCE
CARRIERS
MICHAEL C. GERAGHTY*
INTRODUCTION
In apportioning liability between dioceses and their insurers in
cases of past sexual misconduct by members of the clergy, issues often
arise regarding lost or distant insurance policies. This discussion illus-
trates some of these issues by reviewing a case recently filed against the
Diocese of Spokane, and examining three recent decisions which impact
this topic.
I. DISTANT INSURANCE CARRIERS
In December 1992, the Diocese of Spokane was named as a defend-
ant in an action commenced by a single woman now in her late thirties.
The plaintiff alleged that, from 1968 to 1973, while a parishioner at a
Spokane parish and a student at a diocesan, girls high school, she was
sexually abused, harassed, and intimidated by a Franciscan Brother who
served both at the parish and the high school. The high school has been
closed since 1979. The suit was filed against the Brother, who has not
been in the Diocese since the mid-1970s, the Catholic Diocese of Spo-
kane, the Catholic Bishop of Spokane, the Franciscan Friars Province of
Santa Barbara, and, finally, the infamous Roman Catholic Church of the
Papacy.
* The author is a principal in the Spokane, Washington law firm of Turner, Stoeve, Gag-
liardi & Goss, P.S. He has represented the Diocese of Spokane since 1977. In addition, his
practice emphasizes insurance defense and ERISA multi-employer fringe benefit trust
funds. Mr. Geraghty received his undergraduate degree from the Pontifical College
Josephinum, Columbus, Ohio, in 1964, and his law degree from Gonzaga University in
1973. He is a member of the Spokane County and Washington State Bar Associations and
is admitted to practice in both state and federal courts in the State of Washington, as well
as before the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and the United States
Court of Federal Claims.
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The basis of the claim against the Diocese was negligent supervi-
sion. The complaint also alleged, against the Franciscan Brother, as-
sault and battery, outrageous conduct, negligent or intentional infliction
of emotional distress, and a claim that this conduct was ratified by the
other defendants. The negligence claims triggered the Diocese's en-
deavor to get an insurance company involved.
The damages sought by the plaintiff were typical in a complaint of
this nature: compensation for severe physical, psychological, and emo-
tional pain, suffering, and distress; reimbursement for psychological
treatment; and compensation for loss of family relationship, loss of the
woman's marriage, and loss of her religious faith. Initially, the Diocese
searched to determine whether it had insurance coverage from 1968 to
1973 because this was the first sexual abuse litigation in the Diocese
that went back that far. The Diocese then contacted the insurance
agency that had served it during that period. The account executive who
handled the Diocese's insurance during the period when the sexual mis-
conduct allegedly occurred was retired and had no recollection of which
insurer the Diocese had its policy with. All of the agency records have
long since been destroyed. The Diocese's archives were searched and,
fortunately, established that, during a period from 1964 through the
mid-70's, the Diocese was insured through General Accident, which is
now Safeco Insurance Company.
There was some evidence of a comprehensive, general-liability policy
for the period April 1, 1967 through February 1, 1968, which suggested
$200,000 coverage per occurrence during that period. Some correspon-
dence with policy numbers further suggested that Safeco insured the Di-
ocese in both 1969 and 1971. No records were found for the years 1970,
1972, and 1973. Based on this evidence, the Diocese tendered the de-
fense to Safeco, and Safeco accepted.1 Of course, Safeco reserved its
rights regarding the nature and facts of the case, and whether there was
an "occurrence" as defined in the policy in existence at the time.
One fortunate aspect is that, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, most
insurance companies would have issued a standard, general-comprehen-
sive liability policy form which would not have contained a specific exclu-
sion for sexual claims or sexual misconduct, as we find in policies today.
Unfortunately, the policy limits that were available then are usually well
below the claims faced by insureds today.
1 Safeco assigned independent counsel to represent the Diocese and the Bishop. The case
subsequently went through mediation and was settled.
LITIGATING AGAINST DISTANT INSURANCE CARRIERS
II. FIRST ENCOUNTER THEORY
Another issue concerns the "first encounter" theory.2 This theory is
applied to determine the exact amount of coverage available for older
claims, where an insurance company that provided coverage at the time
can actually be located.
A Interstate Fire & Casualty Co. v. Archdiocese of Portland
The first case to deal with the first encounter theory is Interstate
Fire & Casualty Co. v. Archdiocese of Portland.' In Interstate, a priest
was accused of sexually abusing a young man from 1974 to 1985.4 The
parties settled for a total of $500,000 plus defense costs.' In allocating
the funds, $50,000 came from the priest, $74,997 was paid by the Archdi-
ocese of Portland, $125,000 was paid by another insurer, Lloyds, and
$346,999 was paid by Interstate.6
Interstate brought an action for declaratory judgment, seeking to re-
cover the sums it had contributed to the settlement.7 Interstate's argu-
ment was based on the structure of the Archdiocese's insurance policy.'
The policy required the Archdiocese to make self-insured retention pay-
ments ("SIRs") toward any claim before Interstate was obligated to make
excess payments. 9 Lloyd's policy provided for payments of liabilities ex-
ceeding the SIR payments, up to a maximum of $200,000.10 Interstate,
liable only for coverage in excess of $200,000, argued that the sexual en-
2 See infra note 14 and accompanying text (discussing application of first encounter
doctrine).
3 747 F. Supp. 618 (D. Or. 1990), rev'd, 35 F.3d 1325 (9th Cir. 1994). The district court's
decision in Interstate was reversed after this address was delivered at the twenty-ninth
annual meeting of the National Diocesan Attorneys Association. However, as the "first
encounter" issue remains undecided in many jurisdictions, this discussion is still relevant
to interpreting policies in litigation against insurance carriers. See infra note 14 (discuss-
ing cases adopting Interstate's first encounter rule).
4 747 F. Supp. at 621. In 1983, the priest had plead guilty to charges of sexually abusing
several children, and was subsequently sentenced to jail. Id. Fred Grgich, one of the al-
leged victims, subsequently filed the civil suit at issue in 1985, naming the Archdiocese and
the priest as defendants. Id.
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Id. at 619.
8 Id. at 621.
9 747 F. Supp at 619. Self-insured retention payments ("SIRs") are payments set aside to
cover future liabilities, rather than covering the liabilities through insurance. BLAcK's LAw
DIcTioNARY 1360 (6th ed. 1990). It is common business practice to self-insure up to a cer-
tain dollar amount and to provide for excess liabilities with insurance. See C. ARTHUR Wn-
LIAMS, JR. & RicHARD M. HEms, RISK MANAGEMENT & INSURANCE (3d ed. 1976).
10 Interstate, 747 F. Supp. at 620. The Archdiocese's SIRs were $60,000 in 1978 to 1979,
$75,000 in 1979 to 1981, and $100,000 in 1982 to 1984. Id. at 620 n.1. Lloyd's was obli-
gated to pay excess liabilities up to $200,000 during those years. Id. at 620.
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counters between the plaintiff and the priest were considered separate
occurrences.11 Thus, since the Archdiocese and Lloyds would be liable
for each of these encounters throughout the various years up to the lim-
its of the SIR on the part of the Archdiocese, and up to $200,000 on the
part of Lloyds, Interstate's excess coverage would never be triggered. 2
Lloyds and the Archdiocese, of course, argued that there was a single
occurrence that began with the first encounter between the victim and
the priest, and the Archdiocese's exposure to liability ran concurrent
with the alleged failure to properly supervise the priest.13
The Court agreed with the Archdiocese and Lloyds, holding that the
continuous negligence of the Archdiocese in retaining and supervising
the priest exposed the Archdiocese to liability, beginning with the first
occurrence of sexual abuse in 1979.1' Therefore, the excess carrier, In-
terstate, was liable under the first encounter theory for liability in excess
of $200,000.15
11 Id. at 621.
12 According to Interstate, the settlement payments should have been made as follows:
Lloyd's Interstate's
Year SIR Amount Coverage Coverage
1979-1980 $75,000 $50,000 $0
1980-1981 $75,000 $50,000 $0
1981-1982 $100,000 $25,000 $0
1982-1983 $100,000 $25,000 $0
Id. at 622. By dividing the settlement among the four policy years, the aggregate of the
SIR and Lloyd's limit, $200,000, would never be reached. Therefore, Interstate would have
no obligations. Id.
13 Id. at 622. Typically, an "occurrence" insurance policy indemnifies the insured for any
events or occurrences which take place within the policy period, regardless of when an
actual claim is made. See, e.g., Appalachian Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 676 F.2d
56, 59 (3d Cir. 1982).
14 Interstate, 747 F. Supp. at 624-25. As indicated in note 3, supra, the Ninth Circuit re-
cently reversed the district court's decision in Interstate. 35 F.3d 1325, 1331 (9th Cir.
1994). The court held that the Archdiocese's liability arose from the victim's repeated expo-
sure to the priest, constituting separate occurrences for each insurance policy period. Id. at
1329-31. Nevertheless, other courts have adopted the first encounter doctrine announced
by the district court in Interstate, viewing similar instances of sexual misconduct as a con-
tinuous but single occurence that implicated only the insurance policy covering the period
of the first encounter. See, e.g., Lee v. Interstate Fire & Casualty Co., 826 F. Supp 1156,
1161-63 (D. Ill. 1993) (adopting Interstate view that, under similar insurance policy, actions
of priest and negligence of diocese constituted one occurence); May v. Maryland Casualty
Corp., 792 F. Supp. 63, 65 (E.D. Mo. 1992) (applying Interstate first encounter theory
under similar facts); see also Servants of Paraclete, Inc. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 857 F. Supp.
822, 831-32 (noting disagreement among courts over first encounter rule).
15 Interstate, 747 F. Supp. at 625.
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B. May v. Maryland Casualty Corp.
A subsequent case involving the first encounter theory, May v.
Maryland Casualty Corp., arose from a dispute between the Archdiocese
of St. Louis and two insurance carriers.1 6 The Archdiocese had settled
two claims, both which involved a basketball coach who allegedly sexu-
ally abused two students in 1982.1' Since the first encounter theory,
based on Interstate, was accepted by the parties as the applicable law,'"
the litigation involved which insurance company was liable for the
claims against the Archdiocese. Though the carriers both disputed that
the acts occurred during their respective insurance policy periods,' 9 the
court found that both policies were implicated by the incidents.2 °
This case is not so significant for its application of the first encounter
theory because it was accepted by the parties as the governing law. The
real significance involves the adverse findings against insurance compa-
nies that had not defended the Archdiocese. The Court found that the
insurance companies were liable for reimbursing the Archdiocese as pro-
vided under the policies, as well as for prejudgment interest and attor-
neys fees. 2 ' While the two insurance companies were fighting over
which was liable, neither one of them stepped in to defend, so the Archdi-
ocese settled both cases while keeping the insurance companies fully in-
formed during its investigation.
22
Significantly, May establishes that, where dioceses have a reluctant
insurance company, if it is believed that the company has a duty to de-
fend, the diocese should pursue the insurer. By keeping the company
fully informed during the matter, if the case is settled without the in-
surer defending, the Archdiocese may not be precluded from recovering
the full limit of the policy plus prejudgment interest and attorneys fees.
C. Kansas State Bank & Trust v. Midwest Mutual Insurance Co.
A third case, Kansas State Bank & Trust v. Midwest Mutual Insur-
ance Co., adds a twist to the first encounter theory.2 3 In Kansas State, a
16 792 F. Supp. 63, 64 (E.D. Mo. 1992).
17 Id. at 64.
18 Id. at 65. Although the district court in May adopted Interstate prior to its reversal by
the Ninth Circuit, as indicated in note 14, supra, other courts similarly apply the first
encounter theory.
19 792 F. Supp. at 64.
20 Id. at 67.
21 Id. at 65-67. The court noted that an insurer has a duty to defend the insured if the
complaint alleges facts which place a claim within policy coverage. Id. at 64 (citing Howard
v. Russell Stover Candies, Inc., 649 F.2d 620, 624 (8th Cir. 1981)).
22 Id. at 67.
23 1992 WL 363680 (D. Kan. 1992), clarified, 1993 WL 59175 (D. Kan. 1993), aff'd, 25 F.3d
1057 (10th Cir. 1994).
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teacher employed by the insured Church and school was accused of mo-
lesting a minor student.24 The insurance company took the position
that, in accordance with the first encounter theory, it should only be lia-
ble up to the limits of its policy implicated during the period of the first
encounter, $100,000.25 However, the court viewed an "occurrence" as be-
ing separate for each policy period.26 Kansas State involved policies cov-
ering three years with $100,000 limits each year.27 The court held that
it would allow separate recovery for each year as long as there were oc-
currences during each of the three policy periods.28 With this alterna-
tive to the first encounter theory, hopefully, dioceses will be able to suc-
cessfully assert that incidents of abuse involve separate occurrences in
order to expand coverage beyond the period of the first encounter.
CONCLUSION
Dioceses required to locate distant insurance policies to recover
claims may encounter difficulties similar to those experienced in the Dio-
cese of Spokane. Once policies are ascertained, though, the coverage
available may depend on whether the liability is viewed as separate oc-
currences spanning multiple policy periods, or a single occurrence begin-
ning with the first encounter of misconduct. Depending on the terms of
the particular policy, either interpretation may help the diocese maxi-
mize the coverage it is entitled to.
24 1992 WL 363680, at *1.
25 The insurance policy limited the insurer's liability for sexual harassment or abuse
claims to $100,000 for each occurence. Id. at *2.
26 Id. at *3. See Interstate Fire & Casualty Co. v. Archdiocese of Portland, 35 F.3d 1325,
1329-31 (9th Cir. 1994) (viewing sexual abuse of boy by priest as separate occurrences for
each policy period); Winona v. Interstate Fire & Casualty Co., 841 F. Supp. 894, 897-99 ( D.
Minn. 1992) (rejecting first encounter theory and viewing continued negligent supervision
of priest as separate occurrences which triggered separate insurance policies).
27 Kansas State Bank & Trust, 1992 WL 363680, at *3.
28 With a $100,000 per year policy limit, the insurer was liable for a maximum of $300,000.
Id. at *4.
